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1 Introduction 
Is it a myth or reality that Africa’s slow economic growth is partly attributable to the 
continent’s weak absorptive capacity (AC) and lack of innovative capability (IC)?1 
Should ineffective science and technology (S&T) policy be considered part of the 
‘policy syndromes’ (Fosu 2009; Collier and Gunning 1999) that are widely believed to 
be responsible for Africa’s abysmal growth record? This paper discusses the ICs and 
ACs of African countries, and uses cross-country regressions to explore whether they 
have played significant roles in inter-country variations in the region’s growth 
performance.  
Africa’s slow economic growth has been attributed to various factors, none of which 
surprisingly includes innovation and technology.2 In explaining inter-country variations 
in African economic growth, as well as the episodic nature of that growth, analysts often 
focus on stylized variables such as private investment (Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack 
2003), savings and interest rates (Oshikoya 1992), proximity to the tropics (Sachs and 
Warner 1999), openness of the economy (Hoeffler 2002), and governance (Fosu 2009). 
Yet, historically, technological change has been the most important source of 
productivity growth (Scherer 1984). As Moore (1989: 212–13) also points out, ‘concern 
with technological progress as a source of economic growth in the developing world has 
taken second place in the literature to concern with choice of technology at the level of 
the firm, and the possibilities of substitution among factors, particularly the substitution 
of labor for capital’. The role of innovation and technological change has been 
underplayed by the literature on Africa’s economic growth despite evidence from 
endogenous growth theorists (Romer 1986) and the experiences of the newly 
industrialized countries (NICs) that technological change does influence economic 
growth (Amsden 1989). 
The non-recognition (at least explicitly) of the potential role of innovation and 
technology in Africa’s growth performance may be attributed to a number of factors. 
First, innovation and technology are inherently difficult to model, and analysts find it 
more convenient to regard them asresiduals in growth equations or as part of the so-
called ‘Africa dummy’.Second, data on Africa’s S&T infrastructure are very spotty, 
making empirical analysis a very daunting task. Third, many analysts who work on 
Africa’s growth performance have limited knowledge of the literature on ‘national 
systems of innovation’ (NIS), and are therefore more prone to regarding technology as 
exogenous to African economies.3 
This paper is premised on the notion that, difficult as it may seem, we need to begin to 
investigate the interconnections between AC, technological innovation and Africa’s 
                                                 
1  Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 128) define AC as the ‘ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, 
external information (or knowledge), assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends’. 
2  For instance, Collier and Gunning (1999) did not mention technological factors in their list of the 
various factors that limit growth in Africa (see Table 1). 
3  The literature on NIS is dominated by economists who use an interdisciplinary approach to study the 
impact of S&T policy on growth, income distribution, industrial development, and international 
competitiveness.   2
growth performance.Such an attempt has the potential to yield policy insights that might 
be foreclosed under the current approach of analysing Africa’s growth performance in 
terms mainly of stylized variables. For instance, the salience of innovation and AC 
would imply that African governments should consider using industrial policy to spur 
growth by correcting distortions, externalities, and other failures in technology and 
factor markets. It also would mean that the state should facilitate growth by playing a 
more active role in skill and human resource development. Perhaps more importantly, it 
would imply that more attention should be paid to brain drain from Africa, which has 
recently generated debates amongst analysts and policy makers in Africa (Easterly and 
Nyarko 2008). The paper is structured as follows. Following the introduction in Section 
1, Section 2 reviews the state of scientific and technological development in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA). Section 3 discusses the debate on the salience of IC and AC for 
growth, while Section 4 presents the theoretical model for the paper. Section 5 uses 
cross-country ordinary least square (OLS) regressions to identify some of the 
determinants of inter-country variations in Africa’s economic growth, and Section 6 
consists of the paper’s conclusions and policy recommendations. 
2  How weak is Africa’s innovativecapability and absorptive capacity, and does it 
really matter for the region’s growth performance? 
A logical starting point for investigating the relationship between technology and 
growth in Africa is to ascertain the level of technological development of the region. A 
review of several indicators of S&T supports the widely held notion that Africa has 
weak IC and AC relative to other developing regions. Table 2 shows that Africa’s share 
of world expenditure on research and development (R&D) was a paltry 0.5 per cent in 
2001, compared to 15.6 per cent for developing countries as a group, 27.9 per cent for 
Asia, and 3.1 per cent for Latin America and the Caribbean. Africa’s expenditure on 
R&D as a percentage of GDP has not only been the lowest in the world, but has also 
been declining over time. In 1990, it was 0.6 per cent, and by 1997 had plummeted to 
just 0.3 per cent.4 
Table 2 shows that African countries spent an average of US$6 per person in 2001 on 
R&D (the lowest in the world), compared to US$20 for developing countries, US$46 
for Asia, and US$34 for Latin America and the Caribbean. The table also reveals that 
Africa accounted for just 1 per cent of researchers in the world, again the lowest. The 
region’s unimpressive scientific and technological performance is more disappointing 
when the S&T indicators are disaggregated into various countries as shown in Table 3. 
As the table shows, most African countries spend less than 0.5 per cent of GDP on 
R&D, compared to 1.4 per cent in China, and 3.2 per cent in South Korea. 
Although African countries spend more on their researchers than some developing 
regions, the region has had the lowest volume of scientific and technical publications. In 
2001, for instance, SSA spent US$49,000 per researcher, compared to Latin America at 
US$48,000, and China at US$38,000 (see Table 2). However, Table 4 shows that other 
regions have had higher scientific and technical publication levels than Africa. Between 
                                                 
4  Data on science and technology indicators were obtained from the database of the United Nations 
Educational and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at www.unesco.org. 
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2000 and 2005, the number of scientific and technical publications in Africa grew by 
just 6 per cent, compared to 119 per cent for East Asia and the Pacific, 36 per cent for 
Latin America and the Caribbean, 69 per cent for the Middle East and North Africa, and 
43 per cent for South Asia. According to data gathered from the UNESCO website, 
Africa’s share of world scientific publications was 1.4 per cent in 1990 and 2000, 
respectively, compared to 1.7 per cent for Latin America in 1990 and 3.2 per cent in 
2000. Asia’s researchers accounted for 14.5 per cent of world scientific publications in 
1990 and 21.1 per cent in 2000.5 
The technological output of African countries, as measured by the number of US patents 
granted to firms in these countries, also lags behind those of other developing countries 
(see Table 5). Patent data show that, with the exception of South Africa, Kenya, and 
Nigeria, most African countries received virtually no patents between 2000 and 2008.6 
This is in stark contrast from countries like South Korea, China, India, and Brazil which 
received thousands of patents within this period. Even when one controls for the 
relatively small size of African countries, their technological output has been grossly 
marginal. 
There are variations, however, in the levels of IC and AC amongst African countries. 
Top R&D spenders, according to Table 3, include Tunisia (1.0 per cent), South Africa 
(0.9 per cent), and Morocco (0.7 per cent). In terms of the number of researchers per 
million inhabitants, the leading countries are Tunisia (1,450), South Africa (361), 
Algeria (170), Seychelles (157), and Cape Verde (127). Tunisia and South Africa are 
thus the two leading countries in Africa, with regard to expenditure on R&D and the 
number of scientists. Notice, also, from Table 3 that these countries achieved 
respectable levels of economic growth during the 2005–06 period, suggesting that there 
could be a correlation between AC and growth. South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria stand 
out amongst other African countries with regard to the number of patents (see Table 5).  
Two critical questions need to be addressed regarding the disappointing technological 
performance of most African countries. First, to what extent has the poor S&T 
infrastructure of African countries affected their growth performance? Does the 
variation in the levels of technological development of African countries explain inter-
country variations in the region’s economic growth? The opinion is divided on these 
questions, as the following section shows. 
3  Should we be concerned about Africa’s weak technological capabilities?  
The previous section has shown that Africa has weak technological capabilities, but the 
extent to which this weakness has affected the region’s growth performance is unclear. 
A review of the literature suggests that there are two broad perspectives on this 
question. 
                                                 
5  See the UNESCO database on science and technology indicators at www.unesco.org. 
6  Based on patent data available at the US Patent Office, about 95 per cent of SSA countries received 
less than ten patents each during the past 30 years.   4
3.1  Arguments in support of innovativecapability and absorptive capacity for 
growth in Africa 
Analysts who believe that weak AC and lack of IC have negatively affected the growth 
performance of African countries use the following arguments to support their position. 
3.1.1  Africa is missing out on growth-inducing foreign investment 
It is believed that foreign investors prefer to locate in economies with an abundant 
supply of scientists, engineers, and highly skilled workforce. In other words, they prefer 
economies that are capable of absorbing and assimilating complex technologies. Since 
FDI is strongly correlated with growth (Ramirez 2000; Chakrabarti 2001; Zhang 2001), 
it therefore implies that the surfeit of scientists and engineers in a country would spur 
growth through the attraction of larger flows of FDI. In his interviews with R&D 
managers of foreign corporations operating in China, Chen (2008: 628) notes that ‘the 
primary motives underlying the establishment of advanced R&D centres in China 
concerned not the cost, but the availability of the required skilled labor’. Corroborating 
this point, the director of IBM China Research Labs pointed out that: 
… the migration is not just about outsourcing for low labour rates. If it 
were just about low labour rates, we’d probably have R&D centres in 
places like Romania and the Philippines. China’s advantage is not in low 
production costs. Production costs are even lower in India. China’s 
advantage lies in the availability of the best talent (Chen 2008: 628). 
Because of their lack of technological capability, African countries attract FDI in low-
end activities that do not generate substantial value added. FDI flows to Africa go 
mainly into low-end sectors such as tourism, agriculture, assembly-type manufacturing, 
mineral extraction, retail trade, and banking (Onyeiwu and Shrestha 2004).  
The absolute number of skilled and educated workers in a developing 
country is one factor that ceteris paribus influences the amount of high-
tech FDI a developing country can attract. One of the reasons Ireland 
was able to attract large inflows of high-tech FDI was the relatively large 
number of engineers and other highly trained people it could provide 
(Paus 2005: 193). 
3.1.2  Lack of technological capability weakens Africa’s export performance 
Growth in Africa has been constrained by weak export performance (UNCTAD 2008). 
Export performance, in turn, depends on technological capability and AC. Strong IC 
enables a country to produce high-tech or innovative products that can compete 
effectively on international markets. Technological capability also increases total-factor 
productivity, which subsequently enables a country to become cost-competitive abroad 
(Pack 1993). The experiences of the NICs of South East Asia has shown that export-led 
industrialization strategies are effective mechanisms for promoting economic growth 
(Krueger 1997). But an export-led industrialization strategy can only succeed with a 
strong AC and IC (Kim; Lee and Lee 1987). 
3.1.3  Low absorptive capacity inhibits the growth of manufacturing value added 
Economists who believe in the salience of AC and IC argue that the lack of 
technological capability and AC by African firms prevents them from generating   5
significant levels of manufacturing value added, which has the effect of slowing down 
the economic growth of African countries. Lall et al. (1994) notes that the failure of 
Ghanaian firms to develop skills, capabilities, and technical support led to significant 
and costly deindustrialization in the country during the 1990s. Adei (1990) also found 
that the failure of the Bonsa Tyre Company in Ghana to enhance its efficiency and 
productivity was due to the firm’s weak technological capability. 
3.1.4  Strong absorptive capacity promotes brain drain,investment in human capital, 
and economic growth 
Countries with strong AC (for instance, abundant scientists and engineers) usually 
experience brain drain, as their scientists and engineers seek better opportunities in 
other countries—particularly in Europe and North America. Easterly and Nyarko (2008) 
have shown that, rather than having a negative effect on growth, brain drain generates 
remittances to the country of origin of the migrant. The present value of these 
remittances typically exceeds the cost of educating the migrant, and thus leads to 
economic growth. Additionally, the prospect of earning a higher income abroad spurs 
private investment in human capital, thus enhancing AC and economic growth. 
3.1.5  Historical evidence supports the salience of absorptive capacity and innovative 
capability 
The history of growth suggests that technological change is a major determinant of 
growth. In his seminal article on the growth of the US economy, Solow (1956) showed 
that only about 12.5 per cent of the increase in labour productivity between 1909 and 
1949 was due to an increase in capital intensity. The rest was attributable to ‘technical 
change’. The experiences of the NICs have often been used to justify the salience of AC 
and IC in the growth process (Amsden 1989). 
3.2  Arguments against the salience absorptive capacity and innovative capability 
Those who subscribe to the notion that the lack of technological capability by African 
countries has not significantly affected the region’s growth performance use the 
following evidence to make their case. 
3.2.1  Oversupply of scientists and engineers in Africa 
Some analysts believe that weak AC cannot be a constraint to Africa’s economic growth 
because there are too many unemployed scientists and engineers in African countries 
(Sender 1999). According to Amsden (1997), the abundant supply of scientific 
knowledge in developing countries has failed to generate demand necessary to employ 
it. Unable to find jobs, scientists and engineers in Africa resort to odd jobs such as cab 
driving, street hawking, petty trading, etc. According to these analysts, AC can be a 
constraint to growth only when there are shortages of scientists and engineers in a 
country. Such is not the case in contemporary Africa. 
3.2.2  Innovation and technology diffuse easily across countries 
A country need not develop indigenous technological capability, as long as it promotes 
openness of the economy. This argument is based on the fact that technology diffuses to 
open economies. By crafting effective technology transfer policies, a country can 
overcome its weak AC and IC. During the Meiji Restoration, Japan adopted FDI polices 
that allowed it to adapt foreign technologies to local conditions. Japan’s rapid growth   6
during the post-Second World War era is often attributed to its ability to acquire and 
effectively assimilate foreign technologies (Lawrence 1990). 
3.2.3  Growth usually precedes absorptive capacity and innovative capability 
There is a chicken or egg dilemma associated with the role of IC and AC in growth. 
Some have argued that growth has to occur first before a country can mobilize the 
resources needed to develop strong IC and AC. In the absence of growth, a country may 
need to borrow money or seek foreign aid in order to invest in R&D or train scientists 
and engineers. Resort to borrowing increases a country’s external indebtedness, with its 
negative impact on growth. Research has shown that aid dependency can stifle growth 
(Moyo and Ferguson 2009). 
The arguments for and against the salience of IC and AC all have merit, but empirical 
analysis is needed to validate some of the contentions. In Section 5, I use cross-country 
regressions to explore whether differences in AC and IC explain inter-country variations 
in Africa’s growth performance. To provide a theoretical context for the empirical 
analysis, the next section discusses aspects of endogenous growth models that highlight 
the salience of IC and AC for economic growth. 
4  Technology, absorptive capacity, and economic growth: a theoretical 
framework  
Endogenous growth theorists argue that innovation and knowledge are important for 
growth. Without going into the technical details of this theory, it may be useful to tease 
out aspects of the theory that are relevant to the explanation of Africa’s economic 
growth. The Romer (1986) endogenous growth model7 can be specified as 
Y = K
α (ALY)
(1-α)     (1) 




where Y represents output, K capital stock and LY is the labour force required for the 
production of Y, while A is the stock of knowledge capital in the economy. The capital 
accumulation function is adapted from the Solow (1956) model 
Ќ = SKY – ΔK     (2) 
where SK is the saving rate and Δ is the rate at which capital is depreciated. The R&D 
sector can be modelled as 
Á = ðLA     (3) 
where ð represents the discovery rate of innovations, with 
ð = δ LA
1- λA
ø      (4) 
                                                 
7  The version of the Romer model used in this paper was adapted and modified from Audretsch and 
Keilbach (undated).   7
LA stands for the number of workers involved in the production of new knowledge (i.e. 
scientists and engineers involved in R&D), λ denotes returns to scale in R&D, while ø 
(0 <= ø <= ∞) is a parameter that measures the magnitude of knowledge spillovers. All 
other things are constant, if ø = 0, the rate of knowledge diffusion will be small and 
output will be less. Conversely, if ø = ∞, the rate of diffusion will be very large and 
output will be high as well. The rate of knowledge creation (or the rate of endogenous 
technical change) can be obtained by substituting equation (4) into (3) 
Á = δLA
λA
ø       (5) 
It can be seen from equation (5) that the stock of knowledge (and hence economic 
growth) in the economy depends on the number of workers actively engaged in R&D, 
returns to scale in R&D, and the rate at which knowledge diffuses in the economy. 
Contrary to most neoclassical models that assume Arrow-type learning whereby 
knowledge diffusion is costless and automatic, the rate of technological diffusion 
depends on the availability of human capital, as well as a strong AC (Lai, Peng, and Bao 
2006). If the knowledge generated in the economy is fully commercialized, economic 
growth will be faster and 
A = AC     (6) 
However, growth will be slower if 
A - AC> 0      (7) 
Equation (7) implies that some of the knowledge generated in the economy is not being 
commercialized. A number of factors may explain the non-commercialization of 
knowledge in an economy. First, if most of LA is concentrated in government labs and 
other public institutions, much of the knowledge generated will be ‘basic knowledge’, 
rather than ‘applied knowledge’ or applied research. Thus, a country may have a large 
number of scientists and engineers engaged in R&D, but still experiences slow growth. 
Second, if property rights are not well-protected in a country, firms will be reluctant to 
make knowledge available to the public through patenting and other contractual forms 
in the technology market. Consequently, Ø will tend toward zero, leading to both a 
lower A and AC. Third, if firms in an economy lack AC, they may not be in a position to 
assimilate and commercialize new knowledge. Again, this will slow down the growth 
process. 
5  An empirical analysis of some of the determinants of inter-country variations 
in Africa’s growth performance 
As Table 6 shows, growth in Africa has not been uniform, both across countries and 
over time. More revealing in the table is the fact that over half of SSA countries 
achieved negative average growth rates during the 1990s. At the same time, however, 
countries such as Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Lesotho, Mauritius, Mozambique, 
Seychelles, Sudan, and Uganda achieved respectable average growth rates. How might 
one explain the variation and the episodic nature of growth in Africa? Moss (2007) 
points out that answers to these questions are not only complex, but are sometimes 
inexplicable.    8
A major goal of this section is to use cross-country regressions to investigate whether 
AC and IC explain the differences in the growth performance of African countries. It 
would be recalled from the theoretical model in the previous section that economic 
growth depends on four key variables: (i) investment in physical capital, (ii) the labour 
force, (iii) the volume of technological knowledge generated by the economy (the 
equivalent of IC), and (iv) the rate by which that knowledge diffuses in the economy 
(equivalent of AC). The empirical challenge, therefore, becomes that of specifying 
reduced form growth equations that explicitly incorporate proxies for IC and AC, in 
addition to stylized variables that affect growth. To the best of my knowledge, most 
studies on growth in Africa do not explicitly consider innovation and technological 
variables. 
The following growth equation is used in this paper to explore the salience of IC and 
AC for inter-country variations in the growth performance of Africa. 
GRWT = = ß0+ ß1AC+ ß2IC+ ß3INV+ ß4POP + ß5POLR + ß6OPEN + ß7GOV 
5.1 Dependent  variable 
Given the boom and bust cycles that characterize growth in Africa, the dependent 
variable (GRWT) is the average percentage rate of growth of GDP per capita for 31 
SSA countries over the 2000–08 period. Table 7 summarizes the variations in the 
growth of African countries over this period, and shows improvements in the 
performance of African countries compared to the 1990s (Table 6).8 
5.2 Explanatory  variables 
AC: As equation (5) in the previous section shows, economic growth depends on a 
country’s ability to absorb or assimilate new technologies. ACis particularly crucial for 
African countries, given their relatively weak capacity to innovate or introduce new 
technologies. The ideal measure of AC would be the number of scientists and engineers 
per million of the inhabitants of an African country. However, these data are not 
available for most African countries. In this paper, ACis proxied by the importation of 
information and communication technology (ICT) goods as a percentage of total 
imports. The use of this proxy is based on the assumption that countries with strong AC 
tend to use ICT more extensively than countries with weak AC. Thus, the higher the 
number of scientists, engineers, and skilled workers in an economy, the higher its 
propensity to demand and import ICT goods. The coefficient on AC is expected to be 
positive. 
IC: The ability of a country to innovate and introduce new technologies strengthens its 
competitiveness in foreign markets. By boosting exports and foreign exchange earnings, 
technological innovation promotes economic growth. In a study of 204 Korean firms, 
Young (1992) shows how 96 per cent of these firms succeeded in upgrading their 
technologies and product quality, and subsequently gained international 
                                                 
8  Some observers attribute the improvements in the growth performance of African countries during the 
2000–08 period to economic reform, good governance, and a vibrant global economy that fuelled 
demand for Africa’s exports. This period also witnessed a big surge in the flow of FDI worldwide, 
including Africa.   9
competitiveness. South Korea has been able to sustain a respectable growth rate mainly 
as a result of the technological capability of Korean firms (Pack and Westphal 1986).IC 
is measured in this paper by the total number of patents granted each of the 31 countries 
in my sample during the period 2000–08. The coefficient on this variable is expected to 
be positive and significant. 
5.3  Investment in physical capital (INV) 
INV spurs growth not only by increasing labour productivity, but also total-factor 
productivity. Physical capital can also influence growth through its effects on trade 
(Baldwin and Seghezza 1996; Wacziarg and Welch 2003). Studies on the growth 
performance of African countries often show that low investment share of GDP is a 
major reason for the region’s slow growth (Levine and Renelt 1992). Investment in 
physical capital is proxied in this paper by the average annual percentage growth of 
gross fixed capital formation during the period 2000–08. The coefficient on this variable 
is expected to be positive. 
5.4  Population growth (POP) 
It is widely believed in the development literature that Africa’s high fertility rates may 
be slowing down the region’s growth (Moss 2007). With stagnant or declining output, 
high fertility rates have the effect of reducing output per head. It may also lead to deficit 
spending, as the government tries to provide social services needed to support the high 
dependency ratio that comes with high fertility rates. Population is measured by the 
annual rate of increase of the population of the sample countries. The coefficient on 
population is expected to be negative. 
5.5 Political  risk  (POLR) 
Studies have established a link between political risks, FDI and economic growth. 
Democratic and politically stable economies attract more FDI than despotic and 
unstable countries (Schneider and Frey 1985). Since FDI and growth are positively 
related, political stability then results in faster economic growth. Democratic regimes 
are also more likely to respect civil liberties, the rule of law and property rights—
features that are more conducive to growth and investment. Ngowi (2001) argues that 
many developing countries have attracted little FDI, and hence have achieved slow 
growth rates, because they are regarded as ‘high risk and are characterized by a lack of 
political and institutional stability and predictability’. I measure political risk by 
Freedom House’s Index of Political Right. For each of the 31 countries in my sample, I 
calculated the average of the index for 2000–01. Because the index measures political 
rights in a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1 representing the highest levels and 7 the lowest), 
POLR is expected to be negatively correlated with economic growth. 
5.6  Openness of the economy (OPEN) 
Studies have shown that open economies attract more FDI, and therefore grow faster, 
than closed economies (Chakrabarti 2001; Morisset 2000; Kandiero and Chitiga 2006). 
After controlling for endogeneity and country fixed effects, Hoeffler (2002) found that 
openness is positively correlated with growth in Africa. Removal of capital controls and 
restrictive trade policies spur local firms to eliminate X-inefficiency and move closer to 
the international productivity frontier. I measure openness using two indicators: trade as   10
a percentage of GDP and FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP. I expect the coefficient 
on these variables to be positive. 
5.7  Size of the government (GOV) 
The size of the government can affect growth in Africa. As Moss (2007: 94) observes: 
‘by the early 1980s, it was believed that the cumulative effect of state intervention and 
unnecessary regulation was a major cause of African economic malaise’. Big 
government results in rent-seeking activities that crowd out productive investment 
(Ndulu and O’Connell 1999). They are also a breeding ground for corruption, cronyism, 
and bureaucratic red tape. Conversely, smaller governments tend to reduce budget 
deficits, lower interest rates, and hence boost private investment. The size of the 
government is measured by average general government final consumption expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP, and its coefficient is expected to be negative. 
5.8 Data  sources 
With the exception of patents and political rights, data for the dependent and 
explanatory variables were collected from the World Development Indicators. The data 
were computed as averages over the 2000–08 period for 31 SSA countries. Data on 
patents and political rights were collected from the databases of the US Patent Office 
and the Heritage Foundation, respectively. The descriptive statistics for the dependent 
and explanatory variables are summarized in Table 8. As the table shows, the sample 
countries had a mean growth rate of about 1.7 per cent during the 2000–08 period, with 
a maximum of 5.3 per cent, a minimum of -5.9 per cent, and a standard deviation of 2.5 
per cent.  
5.9  Results and discussions 
The OLS cross-country regression results are summarized in Table 9. They show that 
AC, the size of the government, and political stability are significant for inter-country 
variations in Africa’s growth performance. Specifically, a 1 per cent increase in 
government consumption as a percentage of GDP reduces the growth rate by about 0.12 
per cent. By the same token, a 1 per cent increase in the AC of an African country raises 
the growth rate by about 0.62 per cent. Conversely, a one-point increase in a country’s 
index of political rights (or a deterioration in political rights ranking) reduces growth by 
about 0.57 per cent, though this effect is relatively weak at the 10 per cent level of 
significance. Surprisingly, there is no support for the notion that ICs, physical capital, 
population growth, openness of the economy, or foreign aid explain inter-country 
variations in the growth performance of African countries.9 The finding on physical 
capital is consistent with that of Devarajan, Easterly, and Pack (2003), who argue that 
‘low investment is not the constraint on African development’. 
The empirical results imply that growth in Africa is not simply a question of 
accumulating physical capital, or promoting macroeconomic stability. While good 
policy is a sine qua non for growth (Collier and Gunning 1999; Fosu 2009), sustainable 
growth in Africa also requires the strengthening of the AC of African countries. In other 
                                                 
9  In their recent book, Moyo and Ferguson (2009) argue that aid is inimical to the growth and 
development of African countries.    11
words, growth in Africa can be accelerated if African firms succeed in developing the 
capacity to use technologies developed elsewhere. This result supports what analysts 
believe to be true: that investment in skills and knowledge is critical for growth in 
Africa (Schultz 1999).It also implies that African governments should implement 
measures that would reduce brain drain from Africa. Currently, the brain drain from 
Africa is occurring at unprecedented levels (Easterly and Nyarko 2008). 
Perhaps more revealing from the regression results is the fact that the ability to innovate 
is not as critical for the growth performance of African countries as the ability to absorb 
new knowledge and technology.10 African governments, policy makers and 
development practitioners should, therefore, not take human resource development, skill 
acquisition, and science/technology education for granted. 
The growth-enhancing attributes of technology are not necessarily manifested in the 
ability of African firms to produce innovative and patentable products. They are 
manifested in the ability of African firms to use technological knowledge to increase 
their total factor productivity, as well as move faster along their learning curves. Rather 
than lead to major innovative breakthroughs, a stronger AC enables African firms to 
undertake incremental technical change that enhances their competitiveness in global 
markets (Oyelaran-Oyeyinka 1996). 
One reason why economic growth is slow in Africa is because African manufacturing 
firms produce low-end products that have little or no value added. Quite often, 
manufactured goods in Africa are simply imported spare parts, raw materials, and other 
intermediate inputs that were assembled in heavily subsidized factories. Strengthening 
the AC of African firms would enable them to move into the production of more 
sophisticated products that have a higher value added.  
Beyond the issues of AC and technological capability, the empirical results in the 
previous section also confirm two realities about growth in Africa. The first is the 
notion that big government does undermine the growth of African countries. This result 
is supported by the fact that African countries experienced their worst growth 
performance following a phenomenal increase in the size of their governments in the 
1970s and 1980s. As Table 6 shows, the average growth rates of most African countries 
in the 1990s were negative. These unimpressive growth rates can be viewed as 
consequences of two decades of massive state intervention in African economies. Such 
a phenomenal growth in bureaucracy was spurred, not by the developmental needs of 
these countries, but by political and ethnic considerations. The bureaucracy in Africa 
expanded mainly as a way of providing jobs for those with strong ties to the political 
and ruling elites. The 1970s and 1980s also corresponded with the era of military 
dictatorships in Africa, with their penchant for corruption, irresponsible fiscal and 
monetary policies, as well as misallocation of resources (Ndulu and O’Connell 1999). 
The second reality revealed by the empirical results is the fact that political instability is 
inimical to growth in Africa. One of the reasons for Africa’s poor growth performance 
is the perception of the region as inherently unstable, despite the giant steps recently 
                                                 
10 It would be recalled from the empirical section that the coefficient on patents is not significant. This 
can be interpreted as implying that the ability to produce innovative products is not as important for 
growth as the ability to assimilate and use new knowledge and technologies developed elsewhere.   12
taken by several African countries to democratize and institutionalize good governance 
(Sender 1999). As long as this perception persists, Africa’s growth performance will 
continue to fall short of its potential, and lag behind other regions that are favourably 
perceived by foreign investors and international organizations. African countries, such 
as Nigeria, Angola, and Libya, with higher rates of return on investment have been able 
to mitigate this image problem by attracting equity and portfolio investors who are 
willing to trade risk for high returns. 
6  Conclusions and policy implications 
The preliminary conclusion from the empirical section of this paper is that it does matter 
for economic growth that Africa has weak AC. However, the ability to innovate is less 
important for growth in Africa than the ability to assimilate and effectively use new 
technologies. One major conclusion from this paper is that growth in Africa transcends 
the issues of capital accumulation, foreign aid, fertility, and stable macroeconomic 
policies. It is also about developing the capacity of African countries to generate, 
absorb, and use knowledge in ways that enhance their productivity and international 
competitiveness. 
In addition to addressing the stylized constraints to Africa’s economic growth, policy 
makers and development practitioners should take seriously the need to strengthen the 
AC of African countries. Although many African countries recognize the need to invest 
more in science and technical education, they do not seem to have systematic and well-
articulated S&T policies that focus their efforts on growth-enhancing scientific and 
technological development. It may, therefore, be necessary to consider S&T policies as 
part of the policy syndromes that inhibit growth in Africa. 
In designing and implementing growth-enhancing S&T policies, African countries have 
a lot to learn from the South Korean example. Of particular relevance to Africa are the 
creative ways in which the Korean state selectively intervened to strengthen the AC of 
Korean firms. The Korean example shows that good macroeconomic policy and 
investment in S&T are not necessarily antithetical. They both can be designed and 
implemented in ways that promote sustainable growth in Africa. 
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Table 1: Africa and other developing regions 
Growth-limiting factors  Sub-Saharan Africa  Other LDCs 
Domestic destiny    
Life expectancy in 1970 
(years) 
45.2 57.3 
Income in 1960 (1985 
US$PPP-adjusted 
835.5 1855.2 
Ethnic fractionalization   67.6  32.7 
Domestic policy    
Political rights, 1973-90  6.0  4.0 
Bureaucracy 1.38  1.72 
External destiny    
Population <100 km from the 
sea or river (%) 
21.0 52.0 
Terms of trade volatility  16.4  12.8 
External policy    
Parallel market exchange rate 
premium 
40.0 26.0 




Endogenous    
Growth of GDP per capita, 
1965-90 
0.5 1.7 
Investment rate in 1997 (%)  18.0  25.0 
Population growth rate, 1980-
97 (%) 
2.8 1.8 
Capital flight/private wealth, 
1990 (%) 
39.0 14.0 
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15.6 0.6  20  28.4  347  57.9 
Developed 
countries 
84.4 2.2  377  71.6  3,033  124.2 
Asia 27.9  1.3  46  34.5  537  85.1 
Latin America & 
the Caribbean 
3.1 0.5  34  6.7  715  48.2 
SSA (excluding 
Arab States) 
0.5 0.3  6  1.0  113  49.1 
Arab States (in 
Africa) 
0.2 0.2  7  1.5  489  14.9 
Arab States (in 
Asia) 
0.1 0.2  11  0.1  52  211.4 
Arab States (All)  0.4  0.2  8  1.6  356  23.6 
China 3.9  0.6  17  10.6  454  38.3 
India 2.0  0.7  11  2.8  151  75.8 
Note: *GERD stands for gross domestic expenditure on research & development. 
Source: Computed from UNESCO statistics published in The State of Science and Technology in the 
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Table 3: Technology output, absorptive capacity and economic growth for selected African 
countries (2005) 
Country  R&D as % 
of GDP* 
Researchers 












Algeria 0.1  170  5  2  3.5 
Botswana 0.4  -  5  3  4.0 
Burkina Faso  0.2  22  6  6  6.0 
Cameroon -  26  2  3  2.5 
Cape Verde  -  127  7  11  9.0 
Dem. Republic 
of Congo 
0.5 -  6 5 5.5 
Cote d’Ivoire  -  68  1  1  1.0 
Egypt 0.2  -  4  7  5.5 
Ethiopia  0.2 20  12 11 11.5 
Gambia -  28  5  7  6.0 
Lesotho 0.1  10 3 7  5.0 
Madagascar 0.2  43  5  5  5.0 
Mauritius 0.4 -  5  4  4.5 
Morocco 0.7 -  3 8 5.5 
Mozambique 0.5  -  8  9  8.5 
Niger -  8  7  5  6.0 
Senegal 0.1  -  6 2 4.0 
Seychelles 0.4  157  1  5  3.0 
South Africa  0.9  361  5  5  5.0 
Sudan 0.3  -  6  11  8.5 
Tunisia 1.0  1,450  4  6  5.0 
Uganda 0.2    6  11  8.5 
Zambia 0.0  52  5  6  5.5 
India 0.7  111  9  10  9.5 
China 1.4  926  10  12  11.0 
Ireland 1.3  2,882  6  6  6.0 
South Korea  3.2  4,162  4  5  4.5 
Sources: *UNESCO statistical database; **World Development Indicators ***. 
Computed by the author. 
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Table 4: Regional distribution of number of scientific and technical publications (2000–05) 









20,116 22,818 25,101 30,812 37,075 44,064 29,998  119 
LAC  14,786 15,776 17,126 17,889 19,361 20,045 17,497  36 
MENA  3,689 4,017 4,379 5,154 5,551 6,243 4839  69 
South 
Asia 
10,796 11,334 12,262 13,162 14,086 15,429 12,845  42 
SSA  3,355 3,279 3,438 3,331 3,517 3,563 3,413  6 
World  629,230 628,047 637,041 660,304 687,174 708,086 658,314  13 
Source: World Development Indicators database.   19
Table 5: Number of us patents granted to selected African and other developing countries 
(2000–08) 
Country  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2008  Total 
Benin  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0  1 
Cameroon  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0  1 
Cote 
d’Ivoire 
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0  0  1 
Gabon  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0  1 
Ghana  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  0  1 
Kenya  3 4 1  10  16  10  3 1  4  62 
Mauritius  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1  1 
Namibia 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0  1  2 
Nigeria  2 1 4 4 1 0 0 1  1  14 
South 
Africa 
125 137 123 131 115 108 127 116  124  1106 
Uganda 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0  0  2 
Costa 
Rica 
8 12 8 10  10  13  26  17  13  117 
Dominican 
Republic 
5 0 1 0 0 2 2 2  3  15 
India  131 180 267 356 376 403 506 578  672  3469 
Indonesia  14 10 15 12 23 23 16 15  19  147 





161 265 390 424 597 565 970  1235  1874  6481 
South 
Korea 
3472 3763 4009 4132 4671 4591 6509 7264  8731  47142
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Table 6: GDP per capita (in constant 2000 US$) 
  1960 1970 1980  1990  2000 1990s  avg.  growth 
Angola       928  878  715  -2.0% 
Benin    278 308 314  300  362  1.9% 
Botswana   254  436  1.247  2.487  3,135 2.3% 
Burkina Faso   148  162  181  197  231  1.6% 
Burundi    92 118  126 148  100  -3.8% 
Cameroon    458 448 638  665  587  -1.2% 
Cape  Verde        886  1,222  3.3% 
Central African  
Republic  346 348 316  275  256  -0.7% 
Chad    251 233 152  195  177  -1.0% 
Comoros       420  435  366  -1.7% 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  324  327  252  205  89  -8.0% 
Congo,  Rep.    617 702 957 1,109  934  -1.7% 
Cote d'Ivoire   532  840  945  705  670  -0.5% 
Djibouti        1,246  830  -4.0% 
Equatorial  Guinea      705  2,928  15.3% 
Eritrea          155  na 
Ethiopia        95 102  0.7% 
Gabon    1,658 3,105 4,698  4.097  3,920  -0.4% 
Gambia, The     285  333  328  321  -0.2% 
Ghana    281 296 239  214  254  1.7% 
Guinea        367  420  1.4  % 
Guinea-Bissau   178  144  183 158  -1.5% 
Kenya    213 239 357  379  347  -0.9% 
Lesotho    111 151 312  391  493  2.3% 
Liberia    698 844 747  179  173  -0.3% 
Madagascar    389 409 349  281  250  -1.2% 
Malawi    97 119  158 143  166  1  .5% 
Mali     195  233  193  223  1.5% 
Mauritania    203 353 326  304  355  1.6% 
Mauritius       1,564  2,522  3.727  4.0% 
Mozambique       175  15 I  208  3.30/0   21
Namibia       1,967  1,606  1,802  1.2% 
Niger    321 325 273  197  167  -1.6% 
Nigeria    291 344 409  337  332  -0.1% 
Rwanda    243 231 282  257  235  -0.9% 
Sao Tome and 
Principe      336  314  -0.7% 
Senegal    507 469 417  428  459  0.7% 
Seychelles    2,379 2,646 4.531  5,644  7,619  3.0% 
Sierra Leone   220  281  289  256  126  -6.8% 
South  Africa    2,105 3,049 3,436  3,058  2,910  -0.5% 
Sudan    288 267 283  281  388  3.3% 
Swaziland     727  986  1,336  1,336  0.0% 
Tanzania        267  269  0.1% 
Togo    188 316 383  310  291  -0.6% 
Uganda        177  253  3.6% 
Zambia    528 569 476  389  328  -1.7% 
Zimbabwe    430 570 562  602  570  -0.5% 
Note:Blank cells indicate no data available. No data available for Somalia. 
Source:World Bank (2002).  22
Table 7: Inter-country variations in growth of GDP per capita in SSA (2000–08 
Country   2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Period 
average 
Angola  0.244089 0.161806 11.02018 0.120549  7.81584 17.1139  15.29194 17.09027 11.82888  8.974
Benin  2.561591 1.645041 1.065215 0.437449  -0.32172  -0.45992 0.472246 1.298421 1.836703  0.936
Botswana  6.502947 3.740742 2.062609  5.09605 5.371549 3.495002 1.726112  2.95579  -2.22438  3.125
Burkina  Faso  -1.20325 3.341943  1.37561 4.592841 1.340911 3.099254 2.380972 0.660289 1.504066  1.881
Burundi  -2.32423 0.030144 1.932556  -3.90989 1.813058  -2.05455 2.009157 0.500887 1.441987  -0.06232
Cameroon  1.771618 2.073056 1.586584 1.637693 1.375628 0.079339 1.066531 1.500104 1.892378 1.442548
Cape  Verde  4.674273 1.964746 2.797876 4.423876 -2.31533 4.876618  9.15301 5.406982 4.472311 3.939374
Central African 
Republic  0.315277 -1.50615 -2.18353 -9.01487 -0.56162 0.736164  2.210655 2.314382  0.939726  -0.75
Chad  -4.34492 7.623495 4.492476 10.52384 28.93018 4.366855  -2.93399  -2.55047  -3.134 4.774829
Comoros  -1.21375  1.170614 1.973637  0.333253 -2.32372 2.052218 -0.92212 -1.87638 -1.40384 -0.24557
Cong. Dem. 
Rep.  -9.05242  -4.63458 0.567876 2.650234 3.374268 4.536278 2.272443 3.267545  3.20994 0.687954
Cong.  Rep  5.553603 1.532017 2.283674  -0.8083 1.110569 5.316869 4.120497  -3.3922 3.699694  2.15738
Cote  d’Ivoire  -6.09791 -2.31923 -3.54027 -3.57459 -0.29222 -0.87719 -1.50905 -0.55727 -0.11165 -2.09771
Equatorial 
Guinea  10.13103 57.22622  16.0932 10.80357 34.24308  6.80296  -1.42591 18.26256 8.426275 17.84033  23
Eritrea  -16.2272  4.641386  -1.269  -6.7641 -2.69344 -1.35013 -4.45997 -1.80677 -1.15279 -3.45356
Ethiopia  3.276875 5.471711  -1.11108  -4.67611 10.65981 8.951254 8.011744 8.250979 8.467924 5.255901
Gabon  -4.16102 -0.14115 -2.39409  0.371015 -0.66981 1.025614 -0.73164 3.603276  0.207012  -0.3212
Gambia  1.891968 2.287759  -6.37005 3.525999 3.802559 2.018833 3.515032 3.368421 3.040641 1.897907
Ghana  1.243056 1.556479 2.071982 2.792041 3.231849 3.580941 4.128017  3.88425 4.017138 2.945084
Guinea  -0.07525 2.011802  2.2621 0.153852 0.769219 1.306095 0.093702  -0.63607 5.995637 1.320121
Guinea  Bissau 5.078914 -2.16292 -9.35928 -9.43047 -3.04076 -0.19057  1.109767 -1.62835  0.458455 -2.12947
Kenya  -1.96543 1.128432  -2.02457 0.290753 2.376609 3.053859 3.620489 4.175821 0.902434 1.284266
Lesotho  2.887282  1.68444  0.51793 2.981707 3.697489  -0.08044 7.338714 4.491334 3.381192 2.988849
Liberia  17.85415 -1.73033 0.329687 -33.0732 -0.16147 1.839322  3.55144 4.687005  2.410034 -0.47704
Madagascar  1.68668 2.956788  -15.1565 6.707339 2.341062 1.734901 2.173461 3.391485 4.047422 1.098073
Malawi  -1.3582  -7.53017  -6.88011 3.631472 3.053451  -0.02196 5.452311 5.874488 6.946882 1.018685
Mali  0.329976 8.902275 1.121403 4.268205  -0.85523 2.915368 2.156531  -0.24875 1.886035 2.275091
Mauritania  -1.06231  -0.07284  -1.82349 2.567344 2.223065  2.56542 8.744443  -0.62522 ..  1.564552
Mauritius  3.009046 4.412629 1.834927 2.127237 3.805854 3.739325 2.795169 4.035722 4.660126 3.380004
Mozambique  -1.40574 9.104684  6.12134 3.451868 5.367455 5.988359 6.408739 5.015121  4.46609 4.946435
Namibia  1.364069  -0.59463 3.210346 2.848197 10.84615 1.216163 5.741196 2.381486  1.01778 3.114528
Niger  -4.88713  3.36126  -0.57213 0.800175  -4.2374  3.71898 2.160568  -0.03558 5.964216 0.696995  24
Nigeria  2.67069  0.47012  -1.00076 7.577976 7.921812 2.898398 3.731488 4.102635 2.963698 3.481784
Rwanda  1.108015 3.900803 8.027684 -1.39479  3.69739 5.046027 4.749597 5.152522 8.183147 4.274488
Sao Tome & 
Principe  ..  ..  9.666209 3.634604 4.820877 3.935759 4.953101 4.063372 3.867024 4.991564
Senegal  0.506866 1.875609  -1.93023 3.928725 3.178296 2.894545  -0.27436 1.928061  -0.17106 1.326273
Seychelles  3.326711 -2.35661 -1.80783 -4.86416 -2.49718  6.95196  6.124299  6.71985  1.259501 1.428503
Sierra  Leone  1.262001 14.39299 22.61792 4.849493 3.292852 3.444432 4.006681 3.896412  2.42769 6.687831
South  Africa  1.606285 0.872932 2.675366 1.868776 3.628581 3.745286 4.213257 4.088172  1.29202 2.665631
Sudan  5.919805 3.893944 3.219693 5.023688 3.012526 4.134069  8.90674 7.745232 5.944513 5.311134
Swaziland  8.29087 -0.17437 1.017027 3.258498 1.856651 1.353729  1.75831 2.190254 1.057511 2.289831
Tanzania  2.463467 3.528144 4.463361 2.886361 3.874373 4.447012  3.78411 4.139564 4.401726 3.776458
Togo  -3.91964  -3.06844 1.335707 0.087706 0.440847  -1.31287 1.316085  -0.61651  -1.37354  -0.79007
Uganda  2.412681 1.685993  3.05578 3.087559 3.391017 2.922625 7.226094  5.09412 6.007088 3.875884
Zambia  0.937783 2.384841 0.388174  3.34468 3.109053 2.814729 3.716739 3.660484 3.427493 2.642664
Zimbabwe  -8.52783 -3.06612 -4.51651 -10.3465  -3.6622 -5.16933  ..  ..  ..  -5.88142  25
Table 8: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observations  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
GRWT  31  1.66 2.43 -5.88 5.31 
INV 31  8.60  9.25  -6.58  43.02 
POP  31  2.21 0.83 0.08 3.78 
GOVT 31  15.20  7.26  6.39  45.35 
FDI  31  3.52 3.33  0.6 15.00 
AID  31  9.85 8.06 0.34  31.45 
POLR  31  4.80 1.57 1.00 7.00 
TECH  31  4.97 2.04  1.7 12.20 




Table 9: Results of cross-country OLS regression 
Dependent variable: growth of GDP per capita (Average 2000-–08) 
Explanatory 
variables 
Coefficient Standard  error  t  P>  [t] 
INV 0.015  0.054 0.29 0.772 
POP 0.584  0.658 0.89 0.384 
GOVT -0.125** 0.055  -2.27  0.034 
FDI 0.201  0.147 1.37 0.185 
AID 0.012  0.065 0.19 0.852 
POLR -0.503* 0.283  -1.77  0.090 
TECH 0.646*** 0.249  2.59  0.017 
PATENT -0.002  0.002  -0.98  0.338 






Adj R-squared = 
0.35 
F (8, 22) = 2.99  Prob > F = 0.019  Root MSE = 1.97 
Note: ***Significant at the 1% level; **5% level and *10% level. 
 